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Abstract
When elementary quantum systems, such as polarized photons,
are used to transmit digital information, the uncertainty principle
gives rise to novel cryptographic phenomena unachievable with tradi-
tional transmission media, e.g. a communications channel on which it
is impossible in principle to eavesdrop without a high probability of
being detected. With such a channel, a one-time pad can safely be
reused many times as long as no eavesdrop is detected, and, planning
ahead, part of the capacity of these uncompromised transmissions can
be used to send fresh random bits with which to replace the one-time
pad when an eavesdrop finally is detected. Unlike other schemes for
stretching a one-time pad, this scheme does not depend on complexity-
theoretic assumptions such as the difficulty of factoring.
Note written on 29 June 2014: This paper was written in November 1982 and origi-
nally submitted to the Fifteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, but it
was rejected. Shortly thereafter, two of the authors (Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Bras-
sard) discovered what became known as BB84, which seemed like such a better idea that
they gave up on resubmitting this earlier work. On the occasion of the 30th anniversary
of the BB84 paper, Natural Computing has invited us to get this paper finally published.
This freshly typeset version is scrupulously faithful to the original 1982 submission, except
for the correction of about one dozen typographical mistakes and a few footnotes written
in retrospect by the authors.
∗ 2014 update on email: chdbennett@gmail.com.
† 2014 update on email: brassard@iro.umontreal.ca;
update on affiliation: also Senior Fellow of ETH-ITS and of CIFAR.
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1 Introduction
In conventional information theory and cryptography, it is taken for granted
that a digital message can always be copied easily, even by someone ignorant
of its meaning. Analog messages (e.g. handwritten signatures) are somewhat
harder to copy, but not really infeasible, and digital data can be protected to
a considerable extent by interposing a restrictive hardware interface between
the data and the outside world (e.g. smart credit cards); but in both these
cases, the difficulty of copying is only technological, not fundamental. How-
ever, when elementary quantum systems such as polarized photons are used
as the transmission medium, routine copying of messages is no longer possi-
ble even in principle. In particular, there are ways of encoding messages so
that they can be copied reliably only with the help of certain key information
used in forming the message.
Quantum coding was first described in [W], along with two applications:
making money that is in principle impossible to counterfeit, and multiplex-
ing two or three messages in such a way that only one can be read. More
recently [BBBW], quantum coding has been used in conjunction with public
key cryptographic techniques to yield several schemes for unforgeable sub-
way tokens. Here we show that quantum coding considerably enhances the
usefulness of another standard cryptographic device, the one-time pad.
Mathematically, a polarized photon acts like a two-bit read-once memory
one of whose bits (k) serves as a read key for the other (m). Querying the
memory with the correct k yields the correct value of m. Querying with
the wrong k yields a random bit instead of m, and in either case query-
ing resets the memory so that subsequent queries yield no new information.
Even after a query, it is generally impossible to infer the initial state of
either bit, because the memory gives no indication of whether its response
was the correct response to the correct key or a random response to the
wrong key. Because it represents the behavior of an elementary quantum
system, this kind of restricted-access memory should be thought of as a nat-
ural information-processing primitive, not as a complex technological device
that could probably be circumvented in principle.
Ordinarily, when one thinks of a technological restricted-access memory,
one has in mind an information-storage device. Photons can also be stored
(e.g. between mirrors, or in a closed optical fiber), but they cannot in practice
be stored for very long, and their natural application is in the transmission of
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information. We thus have a situation in which restricted-access memory, as
a storage device, is possible in practice but not in principle via conventional
technology, and in principle but not in practice via storage of polarized pho-
tons. On the other hand, restricted-access transmissions, which can be read
or copied only with the help of a key, are possible both in principle and in
practice using polarized photons.
2 Essential Properties of Polarized Photons
Polarized light can be produced by sending ordinary light through a polariz-
ing apparatus such as a Polaroid filter or Nicol prism. A beam of polar-
ized light is characterized by its polarization axis, which is determined by
the orientation of the polarizing apparatus in which the beam originates.
Although polarization is a continuous variable, and in principle can be mea-
sured as accurately as desired by passing the polarized beam through a second
polarizing apparatus, the uncertainty principle forbids measurements on any
single photon from revealing more than one bit about the beam’s polariza-
tion. In particular, if a beam with polarization axis α is sent into a polarizer
oriented at angle β, the individual photons behave dichotomously and prob-
abilistically, being transmitted with probability cos2(α − β) and absorbed
with the complementary probability sin2(α− β). The photons behave deter-
ministically only when the two axes are parallel (certain transmission) or
perpendicular (certain absorption).
If the two axes are not perpendicular, so that some photons are transmit-
ted, one might hope to learn additional information about α by measuring
the transmitted photons again with a polarizer oriented at some third angle;
but this is to no avail, because the transmitted photons, in passing through
the β polarizer, emerge with exactly β polarization, having lost all memory
of their previous polarization α. Any other elementary two-state quantum
system, such as a spin-1/2 atom, behaves similarly dichotomously and prob-
abilistically.
Another way one might hope to learn more than one bit from a single
photon would be not to measure it directly, but rather somehow amplify it
into a clone of identically polarized photons, then perform measurements on
these; but this hope is also vain, because such cloning can be shown to be
inconsistent with the foundations of quantum mechanics [WZ].
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3 Quantum Coding
In order to encode a message bit m into a photon that can be read or copied
reliably only with the help of a key bit k, we generate a photon with a
selected one of the four polarization directions 0, 45, 90 and 135 degrees.
[Generating a single photon of known polarization is possible by variation
of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen setup [Bo], in which a decaying atom emits
two oppositely polarized photons. By polarizing and counting one photon,
the other’s presence is assured and its polarization fixed without measuring
it directly.] If the key bit is a 0, then the photon is polarized rectilinearly,
i.e. 0 or 90 degrees according to whether the message bit is 0 or 1. If the
key bit is a 1, then the photon is polarized diagonally, i.e. 45 or 135 degrees
according to the message bit.
Def. The quantum encoding QK(M) of a message M by a key K of equal
length is the train of photons obtained by applying the above procedure
bitwise to M and K.
To read a quantum-encoded message with the help of its key, one simply
reads each photon with a polarizer oriented so as to cause it to behave deter-
ministically, for example, reading the rectilinear photons with a 0-degree
polarizer and the diagonal photons with a 45-degree polarizer. An attempt
to read a photon with the wrong key causes it to behave randomly, losing its
stored information. For example, if a 45-or 135-degree photon is read with
a 0-degree polarizer, it will be transmitted with 50 per cent probability in
either case, and all evidence of its original polarization will be lost.
Suppose an eavesdropper intercepts and attempts to read a quantum
transmission QK(M) without being detected. Consider first the case in
which the message M and key K are both random. Not knowing K, the
eavesdropper makes the wrong measurement on half the photons, and thus
obtains a message M ′ differing from M in 1/4 of its bit positions (of course
the eavesdropper does not know which ones). Having destroyed the original
transmission by reading it, the eavesdropper must now, in order to remain
undetected, inject a forged transmission designed to approximate the inter-
cepted one as well as possible. Not knowing which measurements are wrong,
the eavesdropper’s best strategy is to produce a new train of photons in agree-
ment with the results of the measurements, as if they had all been right. Half
of the photons in such a forged transmission will be correct; the other half
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have wrong key values (i.e. will be diagonal when they should be rectilinear,
or vice versa), and when subsequently measured with the correct key by the
intended receiver, these will give wrong answers half the time. Thus the error
probability is 1/4 per bit, both for reading the quantum transmission with-
out knowing its key, and for having a forged replacement agree with what
the original message would have said when decoded by the intended receiver.
Of course, if the intended receiver knew only K but had no prior knowledge
ofM , the eavesdropping would still 1 go undetected, since a random message
with random errors still looks random. Quantum money [W] corresponds to
the case where the intended receiver (the bank) has perfect knowledge of both
M and K, while the counterfeiter knows neither. The usual message M sent
over communication channels is intermediate between these extremes: the
receiver has partial prior knowledge of it (e.g. expecting it to be in English).
Simply encoding an arbitrary message M with a random quantum key K
has two disadvantages: 1) if the message is too random the receiver won’t
be able to detect eavesdropping, for the reason mentioned above; 2) if the
message is too redundant (e.g. English), eavesdropping will be detected, but
by then the eavesdropper will have gained significant information about the
message, perhaps even enough to decrypt it uniquely, because eavesdrop-
ping induces errors in only 1/4 of the bits. (In this respect quantum coding
differs from ordinary one-time pad encryption, where ignorance of the key
prevents the eavesdropper from learning anything about the encrypted mes-
sage,2 though of course it can be freely copied.)
We now define a stronger kind of coding that overcomes both these disad-
vantages. The trick is to make the message redundant with an error-detecting
code M → E(M), then hide the redundancy from the eavesdropper by an
ordinary one-time pad J , before applying quantum coding.
1This word (“still”) appears to be superfluous. The authors do not understand in 2014
what they could have meant by it when they wrote the original 1982 manuscript.
2 In 2014, the authors realize that the phrase “the encrypted message” was ambiguous
and confusing. They intended it to mean the “the message whose meaning had been
concealed by encryption”—i.e. the plaintext—rather than what would nowadays be seen
as its more likely meaning in a cryptologic context, “the message in encrypted form”—
i.e. the ciphertext. Eavesdropping on a classical one-time pad transmission of course yields
complete information on the ciphertext but none on the plaintext.
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Def. For any error-detecting code E (assumed known to the eavesdropper)
let the strong quantum code SE be defined as follows: let J and K be two
random key strings of length |E(M)| not known to the eavesdropper.3 Then
the strong quantum encoding SEJ,K(M) of message M is the train of photons
Qk(J xor E(M)).
It is obvious (because of the one-time pad J ) that the eavesdropper can
learn nothing aboutM from SEJ,K(M). Moreover, for suitable error-correcting
codes,4 eavesdropping incurs a high risk of being detected. Even the rudi-
mentary code of repeating the message twice E(M) =MM suffices to detect
eavesdropping with probability at least 1− 0.79k when k photons have been
intercepted, quite close to the optimum 1−0.75k implied by the independent,
probabilistic nature of eavesdropping-induced errors.
Although the simple code E(M) = MM is nearly optimal for eaves-
dropping-detection, a more complex code would be preferable for another
reason: the detection of deliberate message alteration. Although randomly
quantum-coded photons cannot be read reliably, they can be altered reliably.
For example, the polarization axis of a photon can be rotated by 90 degrees,
without measuring or otherwise disturbing it, by passing the photon through
an appropriate sequence of mirrors (or, more mysteriously, through a sugar
solution). If this manipulation were applied to the first and (n + 1)st photons
of a 2n-photon transmission coded as above, both would be altered with
certainty in such a way as to induce an undetected alteration in the message.
A more complex error-detecting code, e.g. concatenating MM with a check
sum of the addresses of the ones in M , would make such alterations unlikely
to escape detection. In the next section, where quantum transmissions are
used to carry key information for future transmissions, it will be necessary
to use an error-correcting code 5 that provides some ‘diffusion’, in the sense
of making each bit of E(M) depend on many bits of M . This prevents the
eavesdropper who has luckily guessed a few bits of the present key from
thereby efficiently inferring any bits of future keys. Finally, in section 5, we
will need a code E that corrects errors as well as detecting them, to make
up for photons that arrive at the receiver but fail to be detected.
3 In 2014, the authors noticed a possible ambiguity in this sentence. It is the random
key strings J and K that are unknown to the eavesdropper, not their length |E(M)|.
4 In 2014, the authors noticed that they had meant “error-detecting codes” here.
5 In 2014, the authors noticed that they had meant “error-detecting code” here as well.
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4 Reusing a One-Time Pad Safely with the
Help of Quantum Coding
We consider a situation in which two users of an insecure communications
channel, who initially share a finite secret key, wish to communicate secretly
as long as they can. In a classical channel, where eavesdropping is undetect-
able in principle, they must assume that all their communications are being
listened to, and the volume of safe communication is only linear in the size of
the key, unless they resort to pseudorandom key-expansion schemes [BM, Y],
which are at best (assuming P 6= NP) only computationally secure.
We show that by strongly quantum-coding their messages with suitable
error-detecting codes, the sender and receiver can safely reuse the same J and
K keys indefinitely until an eavesdrop is detected. (The safety is not absolute.
There is an exponentially small chance (O(2−|K|)) that the eavesdropper,
having guessed the entire quantum key K correctly, will be able to eavesdrop
on all the transmissions without detection and go on to break the reused J
key in the usual manner, as well as a moderate chance for the eavesdropper
to learn a few bits of the K key correctly and go on to intercept and decrypt
a few bits of each message; but these risks do not increase with the number
of times an apparently secure key is reused.) An eavesdropper who tampers
with or suppresses messages will also be detected with high probability, as
will one who injects false messages.
When an eavesdrop is detected, the sender and receiver can go on com-
municating with only slightly diminished safety by replacing their compro-
mised keys by fresh random information sent over the channel in previous
uncompromised transmissions. With high probability they will be able to
continue communicating in this fashion for an exponential (2O(|K|)) number
of key changes,6 unless the eavesdrops become so frequent before then that
they are forced to use up key information faster than they can replace it, in
which case they will (with high probability) be able to cease communication
before any of their transmissions have become uniquely decodable by the
eavesdropper.
6Note added in 2014: this 1982 use of the asymptotic notation “O” was an example of
the common physics usage, where it may mean either an upper or lower bound depending
on context. Here, we intended a lower bound, which in modern computer science usage
would be denoted 2Ω(|K|).
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Because the replacement keys are truly random, rather than being pseudo-
randomly computed from an original seed, the security of the scheme would
not be reduced by allowing the eavesdropper unlimited computing power.
Neither would it be compromised by technological improvements in the art
of eavesdropping. The scheme does incorporate one technologically unreal-
istic assumption, viz. that photons can be detected with perfect efficiency
(cf. section 5, where this assumption is not made).
We sketch how these advantages can be achieved. The ability to send
many messages without loss of security (when no eavesdropping is detected)
follows from the exponential decline of the probability of escaping detection
with the number of distinct bit positions ever subjected to eavesdropping,
whether these bit positions are listened to all at once, or a few at a time over
the course of many transmissions. For this reason, a quantum channel could
even be used to safely send arbitrarily many copies of the same strongly coded
transmission, without the eavesdropper being able to forge it accurately,
provided the copies were sent one at a time, each only on confirmation that
the preceding one had apparently not been listened to. By contrast, if many
identical transmissions were sent all at once, the eavesdropper could intercept
them all, reliably determine each polarization by multiple measurements, and
then escape detection by forging many trains of photons with the now known
sequence of polarizations.
In order to be sure that no key is reused after a detected eavesdropping,
the two communicating parties must alternate strictly in their use of each
key. Otherwise the eavesdropper could, for example, intercept and absorb
a message from A without forwarding it to B and then wait for B to use
the same key on a subsequent message. The effect of absorbing a message
is thus the same as that of spoiling it through eavesdropping: neither party
reuses the key with which it was sent. If the initial body of shared key
information included several keys reserved for first use by A and several for
first use by B, the parties could alternate in the use of each key without
strictly alternating transmissions. Of course if multiple keys were in use, and
particularly if some transmissions were being absorbed by the eavesdropper,
the communicating parties would have to prefix each quantum transmission
by a (cleartext) indication of which key it was encoded with, to avoid reading
a message with the wrong quantum key and spoiling it.
The ability to change keys without serious loss of security depends on
using a somewhat diffusive error-detecting code when new key information
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is transmitted. With the simple non-diffusive code E(M) =MM , an eaves-
dropper who by good luck has correctly guessed the first and (n+ 1)st bits
of the current J and K keys will know what measurements to make to reli-
ably read and forge the corresponding bits of a fresh pair of random keys J ′,
K ′ when these are sent through the channel in four transmissions strongly
encoded by J and K; as well as confirming, by the consistency of decoding
of the error-detecting code, that the guessed bits of J and K are indeed cor-
rect. Subsequent lucky guessing on further generations of keys (along with
unlucky guessing causing some keys to be rejected due to detected eavesdrop-
ping) could be used to discover additional bits until, in linear time, some pair
of keys J ′′ and K ′′ became entirely known.
To delay this collapse for an expected exponential number 7 of key changes
2O(n), it suffices to use an error-detecting code that diffuses information about
each bit of its argument M among many bits of its value E(M); so that
knowledge, say, of any n/4 bits of E(M) reveals little or nothing about any
bit of M . Many error-detecting codes have this property, e.g. a random
mapping from n-bit strings to 2n-bit strings, or the linear code obtained
by mod-2 multiplying MM by an appropriate nonsingular matrix. With a
diffusive code, knowledge of a few bits of J and K would not enable the
eavesdropper to make reliable measurements of any bits of the replacement
keys J ′ and K ′.
5 A Practical Implementation
Although visible light photons can be polarized with nearly perfect efficiency
(e.g. a Nicol prism can split a beam into two beams, very nearly perfectly
polarized at right angles to each other, whose total intensity is scarcely less
than that of the incoming beam), and transmitted with nearly perfect effi-
ciency (in a vacuum the only significant losses are due to diffraction, and
these can be made negligible by using a beam diameter considerably greater
than the square root of the product of the transmission distance and the
wavelength of light), current technology allows them to be detected with
only about thirty per cent efficiency.8
7Note added in 2014: as in the previous footnote, modern computer science usage
would have us write an expected 2Ω(n) number of key changes.
8Note added in 2014: this was the approximate quantum efficiency of photomultiplier
tubes available in 1982.
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Fortunately, the scheme of the preceding section can be modified to
accommodate finite detector efficiency, at the cost of using a more com-
plicated error-correcting code M → E(M) in place of the error-detecting
code, and a more complicated criterion for key rejection than the detection
of a single error on decoding E(M). Somewhat surprisingly, the modified
scheme remains secure against an eavesdropper with a more efficient, or even
perfectly efficient, photon detector. The volume of safe communication for
this scheme is more than linear, but may be less than exponential, in the
initial key size.
The main modification is to use standard faint pulses of polarized light
instead of single photons, each pulse being of such a size that when it is sent
into a detector of the given efficiency (e.g. 30 per cent), or split into several
fainter pulses (e.g. by a half-silvered mirror, or a Nicol prism) and sent into
several such detectors, the total number of photons detected obeys a Poisson
distribution of mean 1. Such a standard faint pulse can easily be produced
by filtering a standard bright pulse of polarized light to reduce its intensity
by the requisite constant factor.
A standard faint pulse of a given polarization resists copying nearly as
well as a single photon would. The best strategy for an eavesdropper to copy
a faint pulse is to use a half silvered mirror and two Nicol prisms to split
the incoming pulse into four beams, one of each canonical polarization, and
monitor each beam by a photon detector. Most of the time, only one of the
detectors will register a photon, and the eavesdropper will be no better off
than in the single photon case. Occasionally two or three detectors will reg-
ister, yielding more information. Only when three detectors register will the
pulse’s polarization be known unambiguously (e.g. if both diagonal detectors
and the vertical detector register, then the pulse must have been vertically
polarized). The faint pulse works well because the chance of three detectors
responding to the same pulse is only about 2 per cent (for a Poisson distri-
bution of mean 1). The other 98 per cent of the time, the eavesdropper does
not learn the pulse’s polarization unambiguously, and, as with single photons,
cannot reliably copy it. Even a technologically advanced eavesdropper, with
perfectly efficient photon detectors, could not copy faint pulses reliably. For
example, if the advanced eavesdropper uses 100 per cent detectors to analyze
a pulse intended for 30 per cent detectors, an average of 3.3 photons will be
detected per pulse, but the chance that these will appear in three different
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beams, and thus reveal the pulse’s polarization unambiguously, would still
be only about 25 per cent.
The converse phenomenon, namely statistical failure to detect even one
photon when a pulse arrives, requires that the rejection test be made more
complicated. Even if a transmission is not subjected to eavesdropping, about
1/e of its light pulses go undetected, due to normal bad luck at the detectors.
The rejection test must begin by deciding whether the number of missing
light pulses is so great as to raise the suspicion of eavesdropping (a wise
eavesdropper now might not bother to forge replacements for the intercepted
pulses, but instead let them remain missing, hoping to pass them off as
pulses that arrived but were not detected). If the number of missing pulses
is not too great, the error-correcting code must reliably restore the data
they would have carried, as well as checking for polarization errors, which as
before would indicate interception and forgery of some of the pulses. A con-
volutional code [G] appears most suitable for achieving the desired high effi-
ciency of error-correction in a channel with a large number of erasures (1/e).
Depending on the purity of polarization available from the Nicol prisms, the
code could be made to tolerate and correct a small number of polarization
errors, but reject a larger number as evidence of forgery. Since the capacity
of a binary channel with 1/e erasure probability is 0.632, a four-fold expan-
sion in E(M) offers ample room for efficient error detection and correction.
This in turn means that eight transmissions, each containing n fresh key bits,
would have to be accepted to replace the 8n bits sacrificed in a rejection.
The most problematical aspect of the modified scheme is the decision
of when to reject a transmission and change keys. By contrast with the
scheme of the previous section, it is now necessary to change keys periodically
(at least every n1/2 transmissions) even in the absence of any evidence of
eavesdropping, in order to prevent an eavesdropper from intercepting all of
the bit positions, a few at a time, over the course of many apparently safe
transmissions. The expected number of safe key changes has not been worked
out, but it is not implausible that it is still exponential in the key size.9
9Decades after these words were written, the basic idea behind this paper was rein-
vented independently by Ivan Damg˚ard, Thomas Pedersen and Louis Salvail, but they
worked out the complete analysis of its security, which is missing here. Fittingly, these
two papers will appear together in a special issue ofNatural Computing celebrating 30 years
of BB84.
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